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NOTES
MANDATORY RETIREMENT OF STATEAPPOINTED JUDGES UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACTt
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA" or
"Act") prohibits employers from discharging or refusing to hire employees because of their age.' Congress enacted the statute in 1967
after it had determined that older workers faced significant disadvantages in obtaining and retaining employment.2 The Act was an
outgrowth of Congress's general intent to foster an environment in
which employment decisions would be based solely on ability,3 and
it supplemented previous legislation that prohibited discrimination
4
based on race, religion, color, and sex.

One employment practice specifically targeted in the ADEA is
mandatory retirement. In its statement of purpose, Congress noted
that the setting of "arbitrary" age limits has become a common
practice among employers. 5 To remedy this injustice, the Act prohibits employers from requiring employees to retire at a particular
age. 6 Instead, it requires employers and workers to develop alternative means for addressing the problems that arise from the impact of
7
age on employment.
t As this Note was going to print, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in one of the cases cited frequently throughout, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d
598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 507 (1990).
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
2 Id. § 621(a)(1) ("in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to
regain employment when displaced from jobs").
3 Id. § 621(b).
4 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241, 253-56 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988))
[hereinafter Title VII]. For a discussion of the relation between the definitions of "employee" in Title VII and the ADEA, see infra notes 261-70 and accompanying text.
5 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (1988).
6 Section 623(a) of the Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
7 One purpose of the ADEA is "to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." I § 621(b). To further
that goal, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to undertake studies concerning
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The ADEA broadly protects older workers. After amendments
in 1974, 1978, and 1986, the Act now applies to all employees age
forty and above,8 including state and municipal employees, 9 provided that their employers employ twenty or more individuals. 10
Nevertheless, the Act does contain several exceptions to its definition of "employee" that limit the scope of its protection. For example, the ADEA excludes from its definition of protected "employee"
"any person elected to public office" and anyone appointed on the
"policymaking level."' 1
Recently, these exceptions have sparked much litigation concerning the ADEA's applicability to state requirements that judges
retire at age seventy.1 2 The courts agree that the Act does not protect elected judges, as they fall within the exception for "persons
the needs and abilities of older workers and to make such information available to the
public. Id. § 622.
8 See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
9 In 1974, Congress amended the Act's definition of "employer" to include states
and municipalities. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(1), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988)). For a discussion of the implications of this
amendment, see infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
10 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
11 The definition is as follows:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by any employer
except that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to
public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such
officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
legal powers of the office.
I&. § 630(0.
12
Thirty-one states currently have either constitutional or statutory mandatory retirement provisions. See ALA. CONsT. amend. 328, § 6.16 (retirement at age 70); ALAsKA
CONST. art. IV, § 11 (retirement at age 70); ARIz. CONsT. art. VI, § 20 (retirement at age
70); CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (retirment by age 72); CONN. CONsT. art. V, § 6 (retirement at age 70); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (retirement at age 70); LA. CONST. art. V, § 23
(retirement at age 70); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (retirement at age 70); MAss. CONST.
amend. art. XCVIII (retirement at age 70); MIcH. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (retirement at age
70); Mo. CONsT. art. V, §§ 26, 27 (retirement at age 70, legislature may raise to 76);
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 79 (retirement at age 70); N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 25 (retirement at
age 70); N.C. CONS?. art. IV, § 8 (empowers legislature to set retirement age); N.D.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 12, 12.1 (empowers legislature to set retirement); PA. CONsT. art. V,
§ 16 (retirement at age 70); TEx. CONsT. art. V, § 1-a (retirement at age 75); VT. CONST.
ch. II, § 35 (retirement at age 70); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) (legislature to set age
between 70 and 75); Wis. CONS?. art. VII, § 24 (retirement at 70 unless legislature allows longer term); AR. STAT. ANN. § 24-8-215 (Supp. 1989) (retirement by age 70 to
keep benefits); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-9-70 (Supp. 1989) (retirement by age 75 to keep
benefits); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 23.71 (1972) (retirement at age 75); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2608 (1988) (retirement at age 70); MINN. STAT. § 490.125 (1989) (retirement
at age 70); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-7 (West Supp. 1989) (retirement at age 70); OR. REv.
STAT. § 1.314 (1987) (retirement at age 70); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-1530 (Law. Co-op.
1976) (retirement at age 70); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 16-1-4.1, 16-6-31 (1987)
(retirement at age 70); VA. CODE ANN. § 51-167 (1988) (retirement at age 70); Wyo.
STAT. § 5-1-106 (1977) (retirement by age 70 to get benefits).
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elected to public office."' 13 However, whether the Act protects appointed judges is still very much at issue. Most courts, relying to
varying degrees both on concerns about federalism and on the Act's
language and history, have found that appointed judges fall outside
the scope of the ADEA's protection.' 4 Conversely, other courts
have invalidated state requirements that judges retire, holding that
the ADEA protects appointed judges. 15
This Note attempts to resolve the conflict among the various
jurisdictions that have considered whether appointed state judges
may assert the protection of the ADEA to block mandatory retirement. Part I relates the Act's history and describes its present form.
Part II presents the various approaches courts have taken to determine whether appointed state judges are outside the ADEA's scope.
Part III evaluates the various statutory interpretation methods that
courts have utilized and argues that the proper reading of the ADEA
protects appointed judges from mandatory retirement provisions.
I
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

A.

ACr

The Historical Development of the Act

As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA was limited in scope.16
Only employers of fifty or more individuals had to comply with its
provisions. 17 Furthermore, states were not "employers" under the
Act's original definition of the term.1 8 And perhaps most significant, the ADEA did not protect employees over the age of sixtyfive.19
However, Congress made provisions for the Secretary of Labor
to study the need for additional statutory protection. 20 In response
13 See, e.g., EEOC v. New York, 907 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Vermont, 904
F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, I I I S.
Ct. 507 (1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); Schlitz v. Virginia,
681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988); Apkin v.
Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988).
14 See Gregory, 898 F.2d 598; EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52; EEOC v. Illinois,
721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Aphin, 401 Mass. 427, 517 N.E.2d 141; In re Stout, 521
Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989). For a discussion of the facts, holdings, and reasonings of
these cases, see infra notes 43-105 and accompanying text.
15 See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990); Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. 330
(E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the
facts, holdings, and reasonings of these cases, see infra notes 43-105 and accompanying
text.
16 See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-

634 (1988)).
17
18
19
20

Id. § I 1(b), 81 Stat. 605 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988)).
Id.
Id. § 12, 81 Stat. 607 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)).
Id. § 3, 81 Stat. 602 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1988)).
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to the results from the Secretary's investigation, Congress amended

the statute in

1974.21

The amendment expanded the definition of

"employer" to include states and municipalities and lowered to
twenty the maximum number of employees an "employer" could
have and still be exempt from the Act. 2 2 In 1978, Congress again
amended the statute by raising the upper age limit of employees
covered under the ADEA from sixty-five to seventy. 23 Finally, in
1986, Congress eliminated entirely the upper age limit on the Act's
coverage. 24
B.

The Current Age Discrimination in Employment Act

The ADEA prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire,
and from discharging, employees because of their age. 2 5 An individual relying on the ADEA to challenge employment decisions
must show three things: first, that the employer has violated the
Act's general prohibition against age discrimination; 26 second, that
the employer is included under the ADEA's definition of "employer; ' 27 and third, that the individual is an "employee" protected
28
under the Act.
1.

Violation

The ADEA's prohibition against age discrimination is broad,
but the Act does contain several exceptions. For example, the Act
permits otherwise discriminatory behavior when age is a bona fide
occupational qualification, or if required by a bona fide employee
benefit plan. 29 Additionally, the Act expressly preserves the employer's lawful right to discipline or discharge an employee for good
cause.3 0 When private employers have been able to prove that their
mandatory retirement provisions fall into one of the above excep21 Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988)).
22
23

Id.

Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (1988)).
24 Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2, 100 Stat. 3343 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(a) (1988)).
25 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 6. For an
excellent discussion of the current version of the ADEA, see Charles B. Craver, The
Application of the Age Discriminationin Employment Act to Persons Over Seventy, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 52 (1989); Chapter, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act: A Case Study, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 877 (1989) (developed by Suzanne M. Boris).
26 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988).
27 IdJ § 630(b).
28 Id § 630(f). For the text of this provision, see supra note 11.
29 Id. § 623(f).
30 Id.
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tions, courts have upheld the provisions as valid under the statute.3 l
However, the states have never defended their mandatory retirement provisions as falling within any of these exceptions. In fact,
courts have deemed such state mandatory retirement requirements
2
prima facie violations of the Act.3

2.

"Employer"

The Act designates who must comply with its provisions. Any
"person engaged in an industry affecting commerce" with twenty or
more employees is an "employer" under the ADEA. 3 3 The statutory definition also includes any "State or political subdivision of a
State."3 4 The Supreme Court has upheld Congress's power to reg35
ulate both state and municipal employment plans under the Act.
Thus, the state, as an employer of judges, certainly must comply
with the ADEA's provisions.
3.

"Employee"

An individual who has been the victim of treatment proscribed
by the ADEA, and whose employer is included in the Act's definition, still must fall within the ADEA's definition of "employee" 3 6 in
order to assert the ADEA's protection. The statute contains four
exceptions to its definition of "employee." 3 7 Courts have focused
on these exceptions to ascertain whether judges are employees for
purposes of the ADEA. 38 The Act excepts both the personal staff of
state officials and "immediate adviser[s] with respect to the exercise
of the constitutional or legal powers." 3 9 Clearly, judges fall into
neither of these categories. 40 Most litigation 4 l concerning
31
See, e.g., EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (mandatory retirement of
police officers at age 50 is a bona fide occupational qualification).
32 See, e.g., Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 430, 517 N.E.2d
141, 142-43 (1988) (citing Trabucco, 791 F.2d at 3 (mandatory retirement is a prima facie
violation of the ADEA)).
33 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
34 Id.
35 SeeJohnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353 (1985) (application of ADEA to
municipal governments is a valid exercise of federal power to regulate commerce);
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (application of ADEA to state governments is a
valid exercise of federal power to regulate commerce).
36
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 11.
37
Id.
38
See infra notes 43-132 and accompanying text.
39
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 11.
40 See EEOC v. New York, 907 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d
794 (2d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.),
rev'd on othergrounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen.,
401 Mass. 427, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989).
41 See infra notes 43-132 and accompanying text.
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mandatory retirement and the ADEA has focused, therefore, on
whether judges fall within either the exception for elected officials
42
or the exception for "appointee[s] on the policymaking level."
II
THE DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE COURTS

Courts have easily determined that the ADEA does not protect
an elected state judge from age discrimination. 43 Such an individual
is clearly excepted as a "person elected to public office."44 Courts
have differed, however, as to whether the ADEA protects appointed
state judges.
A. Aphin v. Treasurerand Receiver Generalof Massachusetts: State

Mandatory Retirement Provision Prevails
The first court to rule on the issue was the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Aphin v. Treasurer and Receiver General.45
Judge Apkin, an appointed Massachusetts District Court judge,
sought to enjoin the state from enforcing its constitutional provision
that required his retirement at age seventy. 46 Judge Apkin asserted
that the state provision was contrary to the ADEA's prohibition
against mandatory retirement and that, since he was an employee
for purposes of the Act, the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution required that the court enjoin Massachusetts from
mandating his retirement. 47 Massachusetts conceded that Judge
Apkin was an employee under the ADEA, 48 but nevertheless argued
that the supremacy clause did not mandate the Act's preemption of
its state constitutional provision because Congress failed to enact a
42 29 U.S.C: § 630(f) (1988).
43 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
44 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988). The rationale for excluding elected judges from protection appears to have been to allow such individuals' competence to be tested "at the
polls." 118 CONG. REC. 4492 (1972).
The EEOC itself has opined that the "elected official" exception means the statute
does not protect "a state or local court judge who is elected by the general electorate or
who is appointed by the governor or the legislature but must appear on a ballot before
the general electorate for either retention or rejection." Applicability of Age Discrimination in Employment Act to Appointed State Court Judges, EEOC Opinion Letter to
Rep. Claude Pepper (Apr. 7,1987), reprinted in EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) at N: 1001
n.2. A recent federal court of appeals case has considered whether retired state judges,
formerly elected but thereafter appointed and certified by the governor to serve in senior capacity, fall under the ADEA exception for "elected officials." See EEOC v. New
York, 907 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1990) (certified state judge is "elected" within meaning of
ADEA exception from definition of "employee").
45 401 Mass. 427, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988).
46 Id at 428, 517 N.E.2d at 142.
47 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. For a discussion of the supremacy clause and its relevance to interpreting the ADEA, see infra notes 136-87.
48 Apkin, 401 Mass. at 430 n.5, 517 N.E.2d at 143 n.5.
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"clear statement" of its intent to apply the Act to state-appointed
49
judges.
Despite its admitted obligation to declare invalid state constitutional provisions that conflict with federal legislation, the Supreme
Judicial Court denied relief.50 It did so after concluding that "a
[federal] statute should not be read in derogation of a State's sover51
eign interests unless it clearly appears that Congress so intended."
Congress, the court found, had failed to provide a "clear statement"
of its intent to preempt state law. The statute, when "read literally,
might apply to appointed State judges, [but] in fact did so only inadvertently and in an irrationally random way. "52
The court thought it absurd to interpret the ADEA as protecting appointed state judges. 53 It first noted that the vast majority of
state judges in this country are elected, not appointed.54 The court
reasoned that Congress would have no rational basis for extending
protection to so small a minority of state judges. 55 If anything, it
concluded, Congress had reason to leave appointed judges unprotected. The court noted that in the case of elected judges the voters
have the opportunity to weed out "superannuated judges" at the
polls. 5 6 Apparently, the court assumed that, in contrast, mandatory
retirement is the only way in which the public can ensure that its
appointed judges do not suffer from the effects of old age.
Additionally, the Apkin court relied on the overriding policy behind the Massachusetts retirement provision. Mandatory retirement, the court reasoned, avoids the delay and expense involved in
evaluating each judge's competence individually 5 7 and allows the
state judiciary to better serve the interests of the state's citizens. 58
Id at 431, 517 N.E.2d at 143.
Id at 436, 517 N.E.2d at 146.
51 Id. at 431, 517 N.E.2d at 143.
52 Id at 433 n.6, 517 N.E.2d at 144 n.6.
53 Id. at 434, 517 N.E.2d at 145. For a discussion of the "absurd result" method of
statutory interpretation and its relevance to determining the ADEA's applicability to appointed state judges, see infra notes 232-52 and accompanying text.
54 Apkin, 401 Mass. at 430, 517 N.E.2d at 143. The extent to which states appoint
or elect their judges defies easy description because the methods vary so greatly from
state to state. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that only 25 states appoint judges at any
level, whereas 40 states elect at least a portion of their judiciary. For detailed discussions of the various state judicial selection methods, see Legislative Research Council,
Report Relative to Judicial Selection in the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 5492 (Mass.
49

50

1976); LARRY BERKSON, Scorr BELLER & MICHELE GRIMALDI,JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNrrED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1980).

55
56

57
58

Apkin, 401 Mass. at 434, 517 N.E.2d at 145.
Id.
Id. at 435, 517 N.E.2d at 146.
Id.
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Schlitz v. Virginia: The Act Supersedes State Mandatory
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Contrary to the result in Aphin, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held in Schlitz v. Virginia59 that the
state could not mandate retirement for its appointed state judges.
In Schlitz, an appointed state circuit court judge brought suit for age
discrimination under the ADEA. 6 0 The state had refused to reappoint him at the end of his term because he was seventy years old,
61
the age at which Virginia law required all judges to retire.
As did Massachusetts in Apkin, Virginia argued that appointed
state judges were excluded from protection under the ADEA. 62 The
State maintained that the United States Constitution did not empower Congress to interfere with its ability to structure the state's
judiciary. 63 Furthermore, it argued that even if Congress could have
preempted state mandatory retirement provisions, it did not sufficiently express in the statute its intent to do so. 6 4
The district court found that the ADEA did preempt Virginia's
mandatory retirement provision. 6 5 It dismissed Virginia's assertion
that Congress lacked the power to regulate the tenure of state
judges, and specifically rejected the Aphin court's finding that Congress failed to express clearly its intent to preempt state law. 6 6 In
the view of the Schlitz court, Congress's intent to displace state law
would be evident when compliance with both the federal and state
laws was impossible and when state law stood "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives"
67
of the federal law.
Furthermore, the court noted, its reading does not produce an
"absurd result," as the Aphin court had concluded. 68 Even though
the vast majority of state judges are elected, not appointed, Congress was not necessarily unreasonable in treating the two groups
differently. 6 9 To the contrary, the Schlitz court reasoned, the Act
distinguishes between elected and appointed officials, not just be681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id at 331.
Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 51-167(a) (1988)).
Id
Id. at 332. For a discussion of how the Schlitz court addressed the State's power
argument, see infra note 177.
64 Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 332.
65 Id. at 334.
66 Id. at 332-33.
67 Id. at 333.
68 Apkin had held that the distinction between elected and appointed judges was
arbitrary and absurd. See infra notes 232-52 and accompanying text; see also supra note 53
and accompanying text.
69 Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 334.
59
60
61
62
63
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tween elected and appointed judges.70 The ability of elected judges

to remain in office, as is true of all elected officials, inevitably depends on the voters' support. 71 Congress, in excluding all elected
officials, rationally may have trusted the electorate not to discrimi72
nate unfairly between candidates at the polls.

C. EEOC v. Massachusetts: Ascertaining the Meaning of

"Policymaking"
Shortly after the Eastern District of Virginia decided Schlitz, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals considered the ADEA's applicability
to appointed state judges in EEOC v. Massachusetts.73 In that case,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit on
behalf of Massachusetts's appointed judiciary, maintaining that the
ADEA barred the state from retiring its judges as required by the

Massachusetts constitution.7 4 Massachusetts argued, as it did in
Apkin, 75 that the ADEA did not demonstrate that Congress intended
to preempt state law. 76 Additionally, the state argued that its appointed judges were outside of the statute's definition of "employee" because they were " 'appointee[s] on the policymaking
level.' ,,77 The District Court had held that the Act did not preempt
the state provision. 78 It had reasoned that the exceptions to the definition of "employee" within the Act were ambiguous with regard to
appointed state judges. 79 Therefore, the District Court had found

no "clear statement" of congressional intent to preempt state law in
80
this area.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 8 ' In part, the
court based its decision on the rationale expressed by the Apkin
court: Congress's intervention into the states' sovereign affairs required it to "dearly and unequivocably manifest[ ] an intent" to preId.
See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
72
Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 334. Another possible justification for the distinction is
that Congress recognized the electorate's right to discriminate at the polls on whatever
grounds it chooses. Such a position is not unfair to elected officials, since their ability to
remain in office is necessarily subject to the voters' approval in any event. In contrast,
we do not think of appointed officials, and appointed judges in particular, as directly
accountable to the electorate.
73
858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988).
74
See MAss. CONsT. amend, art. XCVIII.
75
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54.
77 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
78
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. 455 (D. Mass. 1988).
79 Id. at 462.
80 Id. at 465.
81
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 53.
70
71
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empt state law.8 2 As did the Apkin court, the circuit court concluded
83
that Congress did not express such an intent.
In addition, the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Massachusetts's contention that appointed judges are "appointees on
the policymaking level," and thus outside the ADEA's protection. 84
The court reasoned that judicial decisionmaking dearly falls within
the plain meaning of the word "policymaking." 85 The court pointed
out that the judiciary often must consider policy in fulfilling its responsibilities, not unlike legislators and executives.8 6 In particular,
it noted that judges often rely on policy when interpreting statutes
or filling gaps in legislation.8 7 Furthermore, the circuit court cited
the legislative history of the ADEA to support inclusion of appointed state judges within the "appointee on the policymaking
level" exception.88 It reasoned that Congress, in creating the exceptions, had sought to strike a balance between protecting individuals from discrimination and protecting the states' sovereign
interests.8 9 The court concluded that in this case, Congress's concern for state sovereignty overrode its concern for the individual. 90
As additional support, the court repeated the compelling justifications upon which the Apkin court had relied, including the costs associated with evaluating each judge individually and the value in
having a judiciary more representative of the total citizenry. 9 1
D. In re Stout: Another Court Finds Appointed Judges
Unprotected
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in In re Stout,9 2 also found

that the ADEA did not protect appointed judges. Justice Stout had
been appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 93 but she reached the age of seventy before
her term had expired. 94 The Court Administrator sought a declaraId. at 54.
Id. at 58.
84 Id. at 56.
85 Id. at 55.
86
Id.
87
Id. (citing EEOC v. Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. at 462).
88
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55.
89 Id. at 56-57.
90 Id. at 57. In so holding, the Court rejected the EEOC's argument that the Act's
history suggests the exceptions to the definition of "employee" should be construed
narrowly.
91 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
92
521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989).
93 Id. at 574, 559 A.2d at 491. Pennsylvania normally elects its supreme courtjustices, but vacancies are filled temporarily after appointment by the Governor and confirmation by the state's Senate.
94 Id. at 575, 559 A.2d at 491.
82

83
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tory judgment as to Justice Stout's rights in light of the state's constitutional requirement that judges retire at age seventy. 95 Justice
Stout argued that she was not an "appointee on the policymaking
96
level," and that the ADEA therefore offered her protection.
In rejecting Justice Stout's argument, the court purported to
rely on the plain meaning of the ADEA exception. 9 7 First, it defined
the term "policymaking" by citing the dictionary definition of "policy": "the act of elaborating... 'a definite course or method of
action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions.' "98 The
court determined that Pennsylvania's supreme court justices do
make policy within that definition. 99 Among the factors the court
considered dispositive were ajudge's role in administering the court
system and the rulemaking quality of the common law.' 0 0 As the
Stout court concluded: "To suggest that a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania is not involved in policymaking matters is to
ignore the character of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon
0
[its] members ...by the Constitution of Pennsylvania."' '1
E.

A Majority View Emerges: Appointed Judges Are

Unprotected by the ADEA
With decisions from federal courts in the Northern District of
Illinois10 2 and the Eighth Circuit,' 03 a clear majority ofjurisdictions
that have addressed the question now holds that state-appointed
judges are outside the scope of ADEA protection.
95 PA. CONST. art. V, § 16.
96 Stout, 521 Pa. at 582, 559 A.2d at 495. Justice Stout asserted two other grounds
on which the court should have held the mandatory retirement provision inapplicable to
her. First, she argued that under Pennsylvania law, the state's constitutional mandate of
retirement at age 70 did not apply to gubernatorial appointees to vacancies in the
supreme court. Id. at 577, 559 A.2d at 492. The court rejected this approach. Second,
she maintained that mandatory retirement violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution, and that the state retirement provision therefore was invalid.
Id. at 586, 559 A.2d at 497. The court rejected this argument as well, relying on its
holding in Gondelman v. Commonwealth, 520 Pa. 451, 554 A.2d 896 (1989) (uniform
mandatory retirement provision does not violate equal protection). See Maimed v.
Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980) (Pennsylvania
mandatory retirement provision not unconstitutional); Note, Pennsylvania Constitutional
Provision Compelling State Judges to Retire at Age 70 Does Not Deny Equal Protection or Due
Process of Law-Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
361 (1980), 54 TEMP. L.Q. 374 (1981) (authored by Meryl S. Diamond).
97 Stout, 521 Pa. at 583, 559 A.2d at 495.
98 Id. at 583-84, 559 A.2d at 495 (quoting WEBSTER'S Nirmm NEW CoLLEGiATE DicTIONARY 910 (1985)).
99 Id. at 586, 559 A.2d at 497.
100 Id., 559 A.2d at 497.
101 Id. at 583, 559 A.2d at 495.
102
EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
103
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
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In EEOC v. Illinois,104 the EEOC argued that Illinois's statutory
requirement that judges retire at age seventy-five violates the
ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination. The district court ex-

amined both the ADEA's language and its legislative history, and
concluded that neither supported the interpretation that the EEOC
had suggested.10 5 The court found that the ADEA lacked the necessary clear statement of intent to preempt state mandatory retirement requirements, 10 6 following the principle that Congress must
explicitly indicate its intent before it may intrude into the states'
sovereign affairs.' 0 7 Additionally, the district court found that appointed judges were "appointee[s] on the policymaking level"
outside of the ADEA definition of "employee,"'10 8 reasoning that
Congress would have little reason to distinguish between elected

judges, who are explicitly excluded from ADEA protection (as are
all elected officials), and appointed judges.' 0 9
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,10 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Missouri's mandatory retirement provision"' as valid under
the ADEA." 2 It too determined that Congress failed to clearly evidence its intent that state judges be deemed employees for purposes
of the statute." l3 Furthermore, the Gregory court expressly adopted
the First Circuit's reasoning in holding that the state's appointed
judges engage in " 'policymaking,' " and thus are outside the Act's
protection as " 'appointee[s] on the policymaking level.' "114 The
court agreed that in resolving disputes judges necessarily engage in
"the same sort of thoughtful judgment" required of appointed
policymakers in other branches of government." 5 It also emphasized that high-level judges "exercise considerable policymaking re16
sponsibility" in supervising the entire Missouri court system.
Finally, the circuit court relied on the "irrationality" of excluding
104
105

721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
Id. at 159.

106

Id

See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 11.
EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159.
110 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, II1 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
III Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26.
112
The Eighth Circuit also found the provision to be valid under the fourteenth
amendment. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 604.
1l
Id. at 600.
114 Id. at 601 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
115 Id. The Eighth Circuit, in citing with approval EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d
52 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussed supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text), explicitly rejected the reasoning of both Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other
grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussed supra notes 59-72 and accompanying
text), and EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261 (D. Vt. 1989), aft'd, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.
1990) (discussed infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text).
116
Gregoty, 898 F.2d at 602.
107
108
109
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only elected judges from ADEA protection, while treating appointed
judges differently without a "principled basis" for doing so. 1 17
F. EEOC v. Vermont: The Second Circuit Disagrees
Despite the emerging consensus that state-appointed judges
are beyond the ADEA's scope, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
in EEOC v. Vermont, 118 recently affirmed a district court holding that
the ADEA does protect state-appointed judges from mandatory
retirement.
The EEOC brought a discrimination suit on behalf of Justice
Louis Peck, a seventy-year-old state supreme court justice whom the
state sought to retire.'1 9 Justice Peck argued that under the
supremacy clause 120 the ADEA preempted the Vermont mandatory
retirement provision.'21 Vermont asserted that its appointed judges
were "'on the policymaking level'" and thus outside the scope of
1
the ADEA. 22
The circuit court relied in large part on the legislative history of
the exceptions to the "employee" definition.' 23 According to the
court, such history indicates that Congress intended to exclude only
"such appointees as would normally work closely with and be accountable to the official who appointed them."' 1 4 Judges cannot fall
within Congress's intended meaning, the Vermont court reasoned,
because the separation of powers doctrine dictates that judges cannot be held accountable to the executive.12 5
The circuit court also criticized the approach focusing on the
literal meaning of the phrase "policymaking"' 2 6 in a majority of the
prior decisions.12 7 The Vermont court conceded that judges do at
117 Id. at 603. The court did acknowledge that the ADEA's legislative history could
support the opposite result in the case, but it nevertheless dismissed such evidence,
"since the only reliable guide to legislative intent is the language and structure of the
statute itself." Id. at 602.
118 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g 717 F. Supp. 261 (D. Vt. 1989).
119

Id. at 796.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2. For a discussion of the supremacy clause as it affects
the applicability of the ADEA to appointed state judges, see infra notes 136-87 and accompanying text.
121
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 35.
122 EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 797 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
123
See infra notes 253-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition's
legislative history and its implications for the Act's applicability to state-appointed
judges.
124
904 F.2d at 800.
125
Id. In Vermont, the separation of powers principle is expressly incorporated into
the state constitution. VT. CoNsT. ch. I, § 5 ("The Legislative, Executive, andJudiciary
departments, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the others.").
126
EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800.
127
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
120
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times state or clarify policy. 1 28 However, it disagreed with those
courts that held that this fact necessarily excludes appointed judges
from ADEA protection as "appointee[s] on the policymaking
level." 12 9 Instead, the court concluded, the ADEA definition of employee is better interpreted to exclude only appointees whose pimary responsibilities involve the creation or adoption of policy as
opposed to its implementation. 3 0 Note that the lower court had
similarly distinguished between a court's "lawmaking" function,
which sets "mandatory standards of conduct," and a government
administrator's "policy-making" function, which sets "guidelines for
present and future conduct."' 3 ' Under its formulation of the standard, the Second Circuit held that appointed judges should be considered "employees" under the ADEA because, although such
132
judges may implement policy, they are not "policymakers."'
III
DIsCUSSION

The foregoing chronology of cases reveals not only disagreement among the courts as to whether the ADEA protects appointed
state judges from state mandatory retirement provisions, but also
more fundamental differences as to how to approach the problem.
Some courts 3 3 have focused on whether the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act preempts state law under the supremacy
clause. 134 Other courts have accepted that the ADEA preempts contrary state law, but instead have discussed whether Congress intended the ADEA to apply to appointed judges.' 3 5
The following discussion critiques the courts' preemption
analysis and their reliance on various approaches to statutory interpretation. It then argues that the ADEA does apply to appointed
state judges.
(1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir. 1988); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571,
559 A.2d 489 (1989); see supra notes 114-16, 84-88, 98-101 and accompanying text.
128 EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800.
129 Id.
130

Id. at 801.

EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. at 265.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected Vermont's arguments that the
application of the ADEA to its judiciary violated the tenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 802.
133
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F.
Supp. 156 (N.D. M11.1989); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 517
N.E.2d 141 (1988).
134
U.S. CONST. art. VI, d.2.
135
See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F.
Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on othergrounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Stout, 521
Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989).
131
132
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A. The Preemption Argument
If the courts hold that the ADEA supersedes contrary state
mandatory retirement provisions, they must do so under the author1 36
ity of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
Under the supremacy clause, courts must resolve conflicts between
federal and state law in favor of the federal law.13 7 Thus, when a
federal statute on its face conflicts with a state provision, the former
38
preempts the latter.
In Apkin,' 3 9 EEOC v. Massachusetts,140 EEOC v. Illinois,'4 ' and
Gregory,14 2 the courts read the supremacy clause to require a "clear
statement" of Congressional intent before reading a federal statute
to preempt state law.143 According to this analysis, the supremacy
clause does empower Congress to preempt state law by enacting
contrary federal legislation.144 However, these courts reasoned, out
of respect for state autonomy, judges never should presume congressional intent to supersede state law; instead, they should interpret a
federal statute to preempt state law only upon finding express con45
gressional intent for such a result.'
All four courts found that the ADEA lacked such a clear state46
ment of intent to preempt state mandatory retirement provisions. 1
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, d. 2.
Id. ("mhe Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
138 See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)
(federal regulation requiring "due on sale" clauses in certain loan agreements preempted state limitations on the use of the clause).
139 401 Mass. 427, 431, 517 N.E.2d 141, 142-43 (1988).
140 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988).
141 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
142 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
143 For general treatment of the "clear statement" rule as a mode of interpretation,
see HaroldJ. Krent, Avoidance and Its Costs: Application of the Clear Statement Rule to Supreme
Court Review of NLRB Cases, 15 CONN. L. REv. 209 (1983); William V. Luneburg, Justice
Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of Clear Statement, and FederalJurisdiction, 58
IND. LJ. 211 (1982/83); William P. Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism
and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 345 (1990); Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) (authored by William W. Bratton, Jr.); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HAuv. L. REv. 892 (1982).
144 See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (preemption of state
law making government rate-setting of interstate carriers contingent on state approval),
reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 925 (1958); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (preemption
of Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939 in light of Federal Alien Registration Act
of 1940).
145 Gregory, 898 F.2d at 600; EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54; EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159; Apkin, 401 Mass. at 431, 517 N.E.2d at 143.
146 Gregory, 898 F.2d at 603-04; EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 53; EEOC v.
Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159; Apkin, 401 Mass. at 434, 517 N.E.2d at 145.
136
137
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According to the courts' reasoning, Congress could not have intended to preempt state mandatory retirement provisions because,
while Congress expressly extended the ADEA's coverage to include
the states as employers in its 1974 amendment, 14 7 the state
mandatory retirement provisions were still valid under the ADEA
until Congress abolished the maximum age limit for covered employees in 1986.148 In effect, the courts appear to be saying that
because Congress extended the statute's scope in two separate
steps, it did not adequately consider the ramifications the Act would
14 9
have on the states' mandatory retirement provisions.
The courts' preemption analysis has two flaws. First, the "dear
statement" requirement is not relevant to interpreting the ADEA.
Second, even if a clear statement of intent were necessary, Congress
has satisfied that requirement.
1. Relevance of the Clear Statement Requirement
The Supreme Court has interpreted the supremacy clause as
empowering Congress to preempt state law; such preemption can
be manifested in two different ways. First, preemption can arise
when a state regulation is in actual conflict with federal law.' 50 The
Supreme Court has held that actual conflict occurs when compliance
with both federal and state law is impossible, 15 1 or when state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 5 2 As commentators
have pointed out, however, "preemption questions seldom arise
153
under such clear cut circumstances."'
The second, more frequent instance where federal law preempts state law is where Congress has enacted legislation on a matSee supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54; Apkin, 401 Mass. at 434, 517
N.E.2d at 145.
150
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983) ("state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law."); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (federal
regulation requiring "due on sale" clause in certain loan agreements preempts state
restrictions on use of the clause).
151
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (federal regulations did not preempt more stringent state law regulating avocados, because both
could be enforced without impairing federal superintendence of the field).
152
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (federal alien registration statute
preempted state alien registration statute, even though not contradictory, because state
statute stood as an obstacle to the execution of the federal statute).
153 JOHN E. NowAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA &J. NELsoN YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 9.1 (3d ed. 1986). For insightful discussions of supremacy clause preemption powers
which formed the basis for this section's analysis, see id.; LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrTUIONAL LAw § 6-25, at 481 (2d ed. 1988).
147
148
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ter and a state law supplements or modifies, but does not facially
contradict, the federal law.154 The inquiry then focuses on whether
Congress "intended" to exercise exclusive regulation in the field.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress must " 'manifest its intention clearly,' "155 but this clear statement requirement does not
mean that Congress must express its intent to preempt state law explicitly in statutory language. For example, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 15 6 the Supreme Court found that federal anticommunist
legislation preempted Pennsylvania's Sedition Act, even though the
statutes were not facially in conflict. 15 7 The Court based its decision
on three criteria. First, it noted that the breadth and number of anticommunist statutes left no room for the states to supplement
them.15 The Court concluded that "Congress ha[d] intended to
occupy the field" exclusively.1 5 9 Second, the Court emphasized the
60 It
need for uniformity in the area of anticommunist legislation.'
determined that seditious conduct was "a matter of vital national
16 1
concern. ... [and] in no sense a local enforcement problem."'
Finally, the Court emphasized the danger that the state law would
obstruct administration of the federal law.' 62 In particular, it cited
executive branch documents that cautioned against the adverse effects that sporadic local enforcement of state sedition acts would
63
have on the federal statute's effectiveness.'
The relationship between the ADEA and state mandatory retirement statutes is more analogous to those cases in which the federal and state laws are in actual conflict than those cases in which
Congress may or may not have chosen to "occupy the field" of regu154 See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (state tort law providing
for punitive damages from nuclear waste accident challenged as preempted by federal
nuclear power legislation, even though no facial conflict existed), reh'g denied, 465 U.S.
1074 (1984); Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 (1982) (state tax on goods
imported from Mexico challenged as preempted by federal law, even though no facial
conflict existed); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (state community property law challenged as preempted as applied to retirement benefits created by federal
statute, even though no facial conflict existed); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (New York requirement that federal assistance be conditioned on recipients' acceptance of work challenged as preempted by federal law, even
though no facial conflict existed).
155
Dublino, 413 U.S. at 413 (no preemption of state requirement that federal welfare
assistance be conditioned on recipients' acceptance of work) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas,

344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
156

350 U.S. 497, reh'gdenied, 351 U.S. 934 (1956). For a discussion of the case, see

J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 153, § 9.2.
157
158

159

Nelson, 350 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 502.

Id. at 504.

161

Id.
Id. at 505.

162

Id.

163

Id. at 506-07.

160
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lation. The ADEA broadly prohibits age discrimination, including
mandatory retirement requirements, and includes the states among
the employers who must comply with this prohibition. 164 Conversely, the state provisions require the mandatory retirement of
judges. 165 Thus, unless appointed state judges are not employees
for purposes of the Act, 166 compliance with both the federal and
state laws is impossible. In such an instance, the statutes are in conflict and the supremacy clause requires preemption of the state
law. 16 7 The clear statement requirement, therefore, is not relevant
to resolving this issue because the situation is one of actual conflict,
not of preemption implied from Congress's intent to "occupy the
68
field."
The Apkin, EEOC v. Massachusetts, and Gregory courts relied on
United States v. Bass 169 in requiring a clear statement of congressional
intent to preempt state law. 170 In Bass, the defendant challenged his
conviction under a federal statute that criminalized the possession
of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. 17 1 Bass argued that the government failed to demonstrate that the firearm had
been distributed through interstate commerce, while the govern17 2
ment maintained that the statute did not require such a showing.
The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument and held
that the federal gun-control statute applied only to guns transported
in interstate commerce, 173 stating that: "unless Congress conveys
its purpose dearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12.
166
In Apkin, Massachusetts conceded that appointed state judges are such "employees." Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 430 n.5, 517 N.E.2d 141,
143 n.5 (1988).
167 Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (" 'The
relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict
with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal
law must prevail.' ") (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
168
A third category of preemption, "express preemption," occurs when Congress
specifically expresses in the statutory language its intent to preempt state entrance into a
field of regulation. See L. TRIBE, supra note 153, § 6-25, at 481 n.14. No express intent
is evident in the ADEA, so discussion of this third category is omitted.
169 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
170 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir.) ("'In traditionally sensitive
areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision.'" (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 349)), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988)
(quoting same language in Bass, 404 U.S. at 349);Apkin, 401 Mass. at 434, 517 N.E.2d at
145 (" 'unless Congress conveys its purposes clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance' ") (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 349).
171 Bass, 404 U.S. at 337.
172
Id. at 338.
173 Id. at 347.
164
165
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changed the federal-state balance." 1 74
While the Bass language1 75 appears to support the conclusion
that a dear statement of intent to preempt is necessary, the question
in that case can be distinguished from the present issue. The Bass
Court refused to read the statute as reaching handguns not sold in
interstate commerce absent a clear statement of congressional intent because such an intent, if present, would have implicated con176
stitutional questions as to Congress's power to enact the statute.
In contrast, the commerce clause unquestionably gives Congress the
power to remedy age discrimination by enacting the ADEA.1 77 The
issue is merely whether or not Congress has chosen to do so. The
courts' reliance on Bass is therefore misplaced, because the power
issues implicit in Bass are quite different from the preemption question that the ADEA raises. The courts instead should have recognized that the ADEA is in actual conflict with state mandatory
retirement provisions, in which case further inquiries into Congress's intent are not even relevant to the analysis.
2.

Congress Has Clearly Expressed Its Intent to Displace State Law

This Note has argued that the clear statement requirement is
not relevant to determining whether the ADEA protects appointed
state judges from state mandatory retirement provisions. 178 Nevertheless, if Congress needed to state clearly its intent to preempt
state law, it has sufficiendy done so in this instance. While the
Supreme Court has held that "'[tihe exercise of federal supremacy
is not lightly to be presumed,' ",179 this presumption is rebuttable by
Id. at 349.
See Bass Court language quoted supra note 170.
176 Bass, 404 U.S. at 349-50.
177 The Aphin court itself recognized that the Supreme Court has held that the
ADEA is a valid exercise of the federal commerce power. Apkin, 401 Mass. at 431, 517
N.E.2d at 143. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 359 (1985); EEOC
v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) ("The extension of the ADEA to cover state and
local governments ... was a valid exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause."); see also Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Va.) ("The ADEA
applies under the Commerce Clause to state employees in general."), rev'd on other
grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
In Schitz, Virginia argued that Congress did not have the power under the United
States Constitution to preempt state mandatory retirement provisions. Id. at 332. The
State maintained that structuring its judiciary was a "core state function" reserved to it
under the tenth amendment. Id. The court rejected this argument, citing Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049
(1985), for the proposition "that where Congress has power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, [U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, c. 3,] notions of traditional state functions will
not preclude exercise of that federal power." Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 332. For further
discussion of Schlitz, see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
178
See supra notes 150-77 and accompanying text.
179
New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)
174
175
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other than the express language of the statute. As stated above, 18 0
the Supreme Court has inferred preemption from the federal
scheme's pervasiveness, i8 1 the need for uniformity18 2 and the danl8 3
ger of conflict between state and federal programs.
In the case of the ADEA, the courts had sufficient grounds to
infer preemption under any of the above standards. Congress intended the ADEA to be pervasive; the legislative history of the Act
reveals that Congress intended it to reach broadly, and its exceptions to be construed narrowly.184 Furthermore, the need for uniformity in the application of the ADEA's remedial provisions is all
too apparent. The legislative history of the original Act refers to the
need for a "'clear cut and implemented Federal policy' "185 and
"the advisability of Federal action." 18 6 Finally, and perhaps most
damaging to the Aphin, Massachusetts, and Gregory courts' findings,
not only does the state provision endanger the enforcement of the
federal legislation, but it flatly contradicts it.187
B.

Statutory Interpretation Arguments

Once it is determined that the ADEA preempts contrary state
provisions, the question remains whether the Act does in fact apply
to appointed state judges. If the ADEA applies to appointed state
judges, then the supremacy clause mandates that courts apply the
188
Act in lieu of state mandatory retirement provisions.
In ascertaining whether the ADEA protects appointed judges,
the courts have relied on various statutory interpretation techniques. These techniques include reliance on the plain meaning of
the statutory language, 18 9 public policy, 190 avoidance of absurd or
(quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)) (The Dublino court sustained a
New York requirement that federal assistance be conditioned on the recipients' acceptance of work.).
180 See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
181 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state taxes on
commerce with Indians preempted by federal law);Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (preemption of more stringent state labeling requirements for food), reh'g denied,
431 U.S. 925 (1977).
182 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (state sedition act preempted by federal
anticommunist legislation), reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 934 (1956). For a discussion of this
case, see supra text accompanying notes 156-63.
183 See infra notes 271-85 and accompanying text.
184 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972), reprintedin 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

2137, 2179-80.

H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) (quoting SECRETARY OF LABOR
STuDY, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (June
1965), reprintedin 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2214.
186 Id. at 3, reprintedin 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2215.
187 See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 136-87.
189 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
185
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unreasonable constructions, 19 1 and legislative history.1 92 The remainder of this Note discusses each of these methods, critiques the
courts' reliance on them, and argues that the correct reading of the
ADEA protects appointed state judges from mandatory retirement.
1. Plain Meaning
One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory interpretation
is the "plain meaning rule."' 193 Put simply, the rule requires a court
to look no further than the statutory language when such language
is "clear and unambiguous."' 19 4 If, on the other hand, a court determines that the language at issue is ambiguous, the court then must
resort to the various other methods of interpretation at its disposal. 19 5 A finding of ambiguity often hinges on whether the statute
is capable of being understood by "reasonably well-informed per196
sons" in more than one sense.
Some of the courts that have addressed the ADEA's applicability to appointed state judges have relied, at least in part, on the
(1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54-55 (Ist Cir. 1988); In re Stout, 521 Pa.
571, 582-83, 559 A.2d 489, 495 (1989).
190 See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57; Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver
Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 435-36, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988).
191 See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 602; EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57; EEOC v.
Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Apkin, 401 Mass. at 436, 517 N.E.2d at
146.
192 See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858
F.2d at 56.
193
2A C. DALLAS SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed.
1984).
194 Id. at 86. The seminal case for the plain meaning rule is Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the language is plain and admits of no more
than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion.") (citation omitted). In Caminetti, the Court upheld petitioner's conviction under the White Slave Traffic Act. The Court refused to
accept his argument that the Act's legislative history showed that Congress, in prohibiting the carriage of women across state borders for "any other immoral purpose," did
not intend to criminalize the transport of women for non-commercial ends because the
statute's plain meaning was clear and unambiguous.
For additional cases refusing to go beyond the "plain meaning" of statutory language, see, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) (plain meaning
of § 703(h) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 required finding that exception to Act's prohibition against age discrimination for bona fide seniority system applied to post-Act adoption of such systems); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (foremen
considered employees for purposes of National Labor Relations Act in compliance with
"plain meaning" of the statute, with no need to look to legislative history).
195 See infra text accompanying notes 218-85.
196 Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Nagle-Hart Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 224, 227, 234
N.W.2d 350, 352 (1975) (plain meaning of tax exemption for "other ordinary and necessary [business] expenses" did not include reasonable entertainment expenses); see also
Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 120, 137 N.W.2d 900, 904
(1965) (ambiguity exists when language will "bear two or more constructions").
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"plain meaning" of the Act. The court in In re Stout, 19 7 for example,
found Pennsylvania's appointed judiciary outside the protection of
the ADEA as "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" because the
nature ofjudges' duties dearly fell within the plain meaning of the
word "policymaking."' 98 In particular, the Stout court relied upon
the Pennsylvania justices' responsibilities in administering the state
judiciary branch. 199 Similarly, the First Circuit in EEOC v. Massachusetts 20 0 held that the judiciary of Massachusetts fell within the policymaking exception to the ADEA definition of "employee" because
the very nature ofjudging requires one to consider policy when filling gaps in statutory text. 20 '
For the courts to base their interpretation of the ADEA on the
"plain meaning" of "appointee on the policymaking level" is inappropriate because the statutory language is far from "dear and unambiguous." Given that the "plain meaning" test is whether the
statute is capable of being understood by reasonably informed persons in more than one sense, 20 2 the fact that so many litigants in so
many jurisdictions have offered different readings203 suggests that
no one interpretation is necessarily correct. 204 As the Stout court
197
521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989). For a detailed discussion of the facts and
reasoning of the case, see supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
198
Stout, 521 Pa. at 582-83, 559 A.2d at 495.
199
Id. at 583-85, 559 A.2d at 495-96.
200
858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988).
201
Id. at 55. For a more detailed discussion of the case's facts and reasoning, see
supra text accompanying notes 73-91; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th
Cir.) (citing with favor EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990).
202
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
203
For example, compare the states' and judges' arguments in EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52; Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489; and Gregory, 898 F.2d 598. In each
case the state argued that thejudges fell within the plain meaning of "appointee on the
policymaking level," 29 U.S.C. § 630(f), while the plaintiff argued that judges are outside the plain meaning of the language. See supra text accompanying notes 73-101,
110-17 for a discussion of the facts and holding of these cases. For a summary of the
courts' plain meaning analysis, see supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
Contrast EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (1990), in which the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the "plain meaning" approach, and accepted Justice Peck's
argument that although judges at times make policy, they are not "policymakers" within
the meaning of the ADEA. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of this court's plain meaning analysis.
204
One might argue in response to this assertion that the plain meaning rule therefore would never be relevant, since presumably issues of statutory interpretation only
come before the court when parties disagree about a statute's meaning. One must remember, however, that when statutes are "plain and unambiguous," Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 489 (1917), "the duty of interpretation does not arise." Id. at 485.
In other words, courts invoke the plain meaning rule in order to bar litigants from suggesting interpretations that clearly conflict with the statutory language. In contrast,
when two or more parties offer differing interpretations based primarily on the legislative text, an ambiguity is apparent and the court must look to outside sources such as
legislative history or public policy to resolve the dispute. In the case of the ADEA, tex-
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maintained, state judges do seem to fall within the dictionary definition of "policymaking," in so far as the judges chart "a definite
course of action" 20 5 for the judiciary and select its "method of action from various alternatives at hand." 20 6 Yet, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in EEOC v. Vermont,20 7 "the principal
business of the courts is the resolution of disputes." 20 8 To the extent that we ask courts to resolve inconsistencies in the law, the Vermont court reasoned, it is more accurate to qualify such activity as
"stat[ing] or clarify[ing] policy" rather than "fashion[ing] new
20 9
policy."
In both cases, each court insisted that the statute's "plain meaning" supported its holding. 2 10 Yet, the holdings of the two courts
are contradictory. Clearly, literal interpretation alone is insufficient
for determining the statute's intended meaning. We need to know
the context in which the language arose before we can choose from
among the possible interpretations.
An additional criticism of the courts' "plain meaning" analysis
is that, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in EEOC v.
Vermont,2 1 1 to say that judges resolve conflicts in policy at times is
not to say they are "on the policymaking level."'2 12 Under the defi2 13 most
nition of "policymaking" on which the Stout court relied,
governmental positions involve the formulation of policy to some
degree. Therefore, under the Stout analysis, the exception to the
Act's definition of employee would leave virtually all government
employees unprotected. 2 14 In effect, the Act's provisions that specifically apply the ADEA to government employees 2 15 would be rentual arguments have been made favoring both inclusion and exclusion ofjudges from
protection. Reliance on the language alone clearly is inadequate to resolve the issue, so
outside modes of interpretation must be utilized.
205
Stout, 521 Pa. at 586, 559 A.2d at 497.
206 Id. The court defined "policymaking" as "the act of elaborating policy" and in
turn defined "policy" according to its dictionary definition as "a definite course or
method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to
guide and determine present and future decisions." Id at 583-84, 559 A.2d at 495.
207
904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
208
Id at 800 (emphasis added).
209
210

Id.

Stout, 521 Pa. at 583, 559 A.2d at 495 (" 'policymaking' ... is to be construed
according to its common and approved usage.") (emphasis added); EEOC v. Vermont, 904
F.2d at 801 (referring to the "ordinary meaning" of "policymaking").
904 F.2d 794.
211
212
See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
213
See supra note 206.
214
The district court in EEOC v. Vermont relied on such reasoning. EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Vt. 1989).
215
See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988) ("The term 'employer' means.., a State or political subdivision of a State"); id. § 633(a) ("Nondiscrimination on account of age in Federal Government Employment").
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dered meaningless. 216
A better reading of the statutory language, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals suggested in EEOC v. Vermont, would except
only those appointees whose primary responsibilities involve theformuation of policy. While judges certainly do fill gaps in the law, and
while they do accept policy-based arguments from attorneys, the
judges' primary function is interpretation, not policymaking. This
reading of the statute is supported by the use of other methods of
interpretation. 21 7
2. Public Policy
Once it is determined that a statutory provision is ambigu-

ous, 2 18 courts resort to other interpretive techniques to ascertain

the statute's meaning. 219 A reliance on public policy is one such
technique. 220 Although difficult to describe in concrete terms, 221
courts rely on an indeterminate number of societal values when
making policy choices between alternative readings of a statute.,
Robert E. Keeton 222 has referred to public policy interpretation as
"resolv[ing] the problem at hand in a way that in the court's view
produces the best total set of rules, including those within the core
area of the statute and other cognate rules of law, whatever their
source." 223
The courts in Apkin and EEOC v. Massachusetts justified their
holdings that appointed state judges are outside the ADEA's protection by emphasizing the positive effects that mandatory retirement
provisions have for society. 224 Both courts emphasized the need for
216 EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. at 264; see also infra notes 232-52 and accompanying text (discussion of the presumption that Congress does not enact meaningless
provisions and the role of that presumption in avoiding absurd results in statutory
interpretation).
217
See infra notes 219-85 and accompanying text.
218
See supra text accompanying note 196.
219
See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (courts may look
beyond language if ambiguous); American Oil Co. v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 496,
177 A.2d 358, 360 (1962) (interpretation is necessary whenever the meaning of statutory language is subject to various interpretations).
220 2A C. SANDS, supra note 193, § 56.01.
221
Id.
222 Now United States District Judge Keeton of the District of Massachusetts.
223
ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JusTicE 94-95 (1969), quoted in 2A C.
SANDS, supra note 193, § 45.09, at 41.
224 See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57-58 (Ist Cir. 1988); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 435-36, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.) (citing the Apkin and EEOC v. Massachusetts decisions with favor in finding a "rational basis" for mandatory retirement of
judges), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
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a judiciary that represents the various elements of society. 225 Since
discrimination based on race, religion, and sex was still widespread
during the period when many older judges were appointed, they argued, requiring their retirement at age seventy allows the state to
replace a predominantly white, male judiciary with judges from underrepresented minorities. 226 Furthermore, mandatory retirement
allows states to avoid the otherwise costly and difficult process of
227
conducting individual evaluations of its older judges.
This policy analysis disregards the very purpose of the
ADEA. 228 Congress, in enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, sought to promote the very individualized, merit-based
system for evaluating job performance that these courts daim would
be too costly for states to implement. 229 While the ADEA effectively
prohibits employers from drawing inferences about an individual's
ability based on that individual's age, the Apkin and Massachusetts
courts used identical inferences to justify their exclusion of appointed judges from the statute's protection. 23 0 In so doing, the
courts actually subordinated federal public policy to state public
policy, since Congress had already set a policy against age discrimi23 1
nation with its enactment of the ADEA.
3.

The Absurd Result Argument

According to the Supreme Court, "[s]tatutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results
whenever possible." 23 2 Courts frequently invoke this "absurd re225 EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 58; Apkin, 401 Mass. at 436, 517 N.E.2d at
146.
226 EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 58; Apkin, 401 Mass. at 436, 517 N.E.2d at
146.
227 EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57.
228 According to Sands, "purposive" analysis can take the form of either an attempt
to ascertain legislative intent or an attempt to ascertain the "meaning" of the statutory
language. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 193, § 45.08. The difference stems merely from the
amount of weight that the court is willing to give extrinsic evidence in construing the
statute. Id. When this Note refers to "purpose," therefore, the term refers to the general effect the statute is to have, whether that effect be the one intended by the legislature or the one reasonably foreseeable from the statutory language.
229 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
280 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on this reasoning in rejecting Vermont's public policy arguments for the exclusion of appointed state judges from ADEA
protection. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Congress enacted
the ADEA precisely in order to permit older employees to be evaluated on their merits
rather than simply on the basis of age ....
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress's
[sic] determination supersedes any state scheme to avoid decisions on an individual's
merits.").
231
See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 253-85 and accompanying text.
232 American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (rejecting interpreta-
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sult" criterion in rejecting proposed interpretations. 23 3 The ration-

ale for such an approach is that Congress is presumed to be a
rational body that could not intend to render already existing statutes meaningless, or to include contradictory provisions within one
2

act. M4
The courts in Aphin, EEOC v. Massachusetts, EEOC v. Illinois, and
Gregory concluded that it is absurd to read the ADEA as protecting
appointed, but not elected, judges. 23 5 The Apkin court determined
that "[t]here is no logical or rational reason why elected Justices of
the Supreme Court of Washington... may be required by state law
to retire at a given age and [the appointed] Justices of this court may
not. 2 3s 6 It therefore concluded that Congress inadvertently omitted
the phrase "appointed judges" from the statutory language. 23 7 Similarly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v. Massachusetts
found that "[t]he distinction between elected and appointed state
judges... is nonsensical.... As far as their functions within the
state government are concerned, the two kinds ofjudges are identical."' 238 The district court in EEOC v. Illinois concurred: "There is
no principled basis, either in the language of the statute or in the
expressed legislative intent, to treat appointed judges differently
23 9
from elected judges."
Not all of the courts that have considered the question agree
that the protection of appointed, but not elected, judges is absurd.

tion of statute which would make illegal employers' adoption of seniority systems which
the statute would protect if the system had predated the statute).
233
See, e.g., Lovely v. Cunningham, 796 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (favoring interpretation which, although in effect required excision of words from statute, rendered statute
meaningful and avoided absurdity); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell Inc., 771
F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (courts should deviate from literal interpretation of a statute if
that interpretation would lead to an absurd result).
234 Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404,409 (1945) ("The process ofinterpretation...
misses its high function ifa strict reading of a law results in the emasculation or deletion
of a provision which a less than literal reading would preserve."); Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338, 344 (1945) ("where another interpretation is wholly permissible,

we would be reluctant to give a statute that construction which makes it wholly redundant."); see 2A C. SANDS, supra note 193, § 45.12, and cases cited therein.
235 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v Illinois, 721 F.
Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427,
436, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988).
236

Apkin, 401 Mass. at 434, 517 N.E.2d at 145.

237

Id., 517 N.E.2d at 146.

238

EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57.

EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159; see also Gregory, 898 F.2d at 603 ("where the
majority of state judges are elected, the irrationality of not excluding appointed judges
239

from the ADEA...

is even more pronounced").
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In Schlitz v. Virginia2 4 ° and EEOC v. Vermont, 24 1 the courts justified
their holdings that only appointed judges were protected as entirely
reasonable.
In Schlitz, the district court rejected the State's argument that
because elected state judges far outnumber appointed ones, it
would be absurd for the ADEA to protect the tiny minority of appointed judges. 24 2 The court reasoned that "the [alleged] absurdity
. . . is the result of [the State's] improperly narrow view of the
ADEA."'243 It pointed out that Congress excluded elected officials
from protection, not just electedjudges. 244 In the view of the Schlitz
24 5
court, the distinction was entirely rational.
The Schlitz court was correct in its assessment that the distinction between protecting appointed and elected officials from age
discrimination is rational. To protect elected judges from age discrimination would be of little practical import since they hold their
positions entirely at the whim of the voters. 24 6 Presumably, nothing
exists to stop the voters from depriving an elected official of continued employment for even the most arbitrary reasons. Similarly,
elected officials' immediate advisers remain in office only as long as
the electorate supports their superiors. Conversely, other appointed officials are not immediately accountable to the public; such
individuals hold their positions independent of popular support. In
the case of appointed judges, therefore, age discrimination would
unjustly deprive them of their otherwise secure positions of employment, whereas elected officials rely on no such assumptions.
The court in EEOC v. Vermont also rejected the suggestion that
the protection of appointed judges under the ADEA would lead
to an "absurd result." 24 7 The circuit court presumed that Congress
240 681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
For a more detailed discussion of the facts and holding of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 59-72.
241
904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990). For a more detailed discussion of the facts and
holding of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 118-32.
242
Schlitz, 681 F. Supp. at 334.
243 Id.
244
Id.
245 Id.
246 This argument necessarily assumes no practical difference between voters refusing at the polls to elect a judge over 70 years of age and production of the same result
through their representatives via legislation. One might contend, to the contrary, that
representative government does not closely approximate the wishes of the voting public.
Such a debate, however, is outside the scope of this Note.
247 EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 801-02. In fact, the district court in that case had
reasoned that to except appointed judges from ADEA protection would be "manifestly
illogical." Id. In its view, a definition of "policymaker" broad enough to exclude appointed judges from protection would also exclude virtually every government employee. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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was aware that some judges are elected and that some are appointed; it reasoned that Congress could have avoided the different
treatment of each type by so providing in the Act. 248 One could
even argue that the State's interpretation itself would also raise
an absurdity, because it would render meaningless Congress's attempt to apply the ADEA both to the states and to the federal
bureaucracy. 249
The blanket assertion made by the Apkin, EEOC v. Massachusetts,
Gregory, and EEOC v. Illinois courts25 0-that ADEA protection solely
of appointed state judges is absurd-misapplies the "absurd result"
standard. As the Schlitz and EEOC v. Vermont opinions demonstrate,
one can formulate rational justifications for an interpretation that
251
would include appointed judges as "employees" under the Act.
The interpretations that the courts dismiss as "absurd" are in fact
nothing of the kind. Truly absurd interpretations would render
parts of a statute meaningless or cause conflict between different
252
sections of a single act.
Perhaps when the courts label as absurd the inclusion of appointed judges within the ADEA definition of "employee," they really mean to imply that such a reading of the statute is unlikely to be
what Congress intended. As the discussion below indicates, however, the legislative history of the ADEA exceptions supports the
outcome reached in the Schlitz and Vermont cases-that the ADEA
protects appointed state judges from mandatory retirement.
4.

The Legislative History of the ADEA Exceptions

If a statute's meaning remains unclear even after a court has
scrutinized the language and ruled out all readings that are absurd
or contrary to overriding policy concerns, then it might turn to extrinsic evidence such as legislative history. 2 53 Such history might in248

EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 802 ("Any perceived imprudence in this dichot-

omy is a matter to be addressed to Congress.").
249
See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
250 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir.) ("no principled basis" for different treatment of elected and appointed judges), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990);
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1988) ("the distinction between
elected and appointed state judges ... is nonsensical"); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp.
156, 159 (N.D. Ml1.1989) (only a reading of the ADEA which excludes appointed state
judges from ADEA protection is "rational"); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 401
Mass. 427, 436, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988) (application of ADEA to appointed state
judges is an "absurd result").
251

See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.

252 Kuzma v. IRS, 821 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting interpretation that would
render related statute meaningless); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th
Cir. 1984) (rejecting interpretation of section in statute that would render another secdon meaningless).
253 Courts sometimes are willing to consider legislative history even without a pre-
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dude the circumstances and events leading to a statute's enactment,
and statements made by committees and individuals during the leg2
islative process. M
In considering whether appointed state judges are included in
the ADEA's definition of "employee," the courts in EEOC v. Massachusetts and EEOC v. Vermont both looked to the legislative history of
the ADEA's exceptions. 25 5 The EEOC v. Massachusetts court conduded from the history that Congress excepted appointed judges
from ADEA protection when it excluded "appointee[s] on the poli'cymaking level." 2 56 The EEOC v. Vermont court, however, reached
the opposite conclusion.2 5 7 The EEOC v. Vermont court relied heavily on both the Conference Report that first set out the exceptions 258 and the floor debate in the Senate leading up to the
exceptions' enactment. 259 In the report, the committee specified
that the exceptions were to be construed narrowly.
As the analysis below indicates, the EEOC v. Vermont approach is
the better reading of the ADEA. After explaining the similarities
between the ADEA exceptions and Title VII's exceptions, 260 the
remainder of this section will argue that the legislative history of
the exceptions demonstrates conclusively that Congress intended
the ADEA to protect appointed state judges from mandatory
retirement.
a. Reliance on Title VII in Interpretingthe ADEA
The ADEA's legislative history is remarkable because of the
lack of attention Congress devoted to defining the statutory exceptions to "employee." In fact, nowhere in the debates or legislative
record does one find any mention ofjudges at all. 2 6 ' The legislative
liminary finding that the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous. See, e.g., Escobar v.
INS, 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988) (legislative history relevant, despite clarity of statutory language, to indicate purpose of statute as a whole).
254
See 2A C. SANDS, supra note 193, § 48.01.
255
See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Vermont, 904
F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
256
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 56.
257
EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 802.
258
H.R. CONF.REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2179-80. For a discussion of the use of Title VII in interpreting the ADEA, see infra text accompanying notes 261-70.
259
118 CONG. REc. 4096, 4483, 4492-93 (1972).
260 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(f) (1988).
261
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5628; S.REP. No. 467, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2974; H.R. CONF. REP.No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 528; S.REP. No. 493, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 504; H.R. REP. No. 805,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213.
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history of the ADEA exceptions therefore offers little help in clarifying their precise meaning. However, the legislative history of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,262 as modified by The Equal
Employment Opportunities Act ("EEOA"),2 63 is particularly relevant to interpretating the ADEA because it contains the identical
definition for "employee," as well as the identical exceptions.2 6 4
The Supreme Court expressly endorsed the use of Title VII
analogies for purposes of interpreting the ADEA in Oscar Mayer &
Co. v. Evans.26 5 In Oscar Mayer, the plaintiff brought suit in federal
court to challenge his employer's mandatory retirement requirements as violative of the ADEA. 2 66 The Supreme Court dismissed
26 7
the suit because the plaintiff failed to exhaust state remedies.
While nothing in the ADEA's legislative history suggested such a
result, the Court relied exclusively on Tide VII's history, which did
suggest that plaintiffs must exhaust state remedies before resorting
to suit in federal court. 2 68 The Court noted that both statutes share
the purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace, both
have identical language in many parts, and in many instances Title
VII was the actual source of language for the ADEA.2 69 Accordingly, the court held that reliance on Tide VII's history to interpret
the comparable ADEA provision was entirely appropriate. 27 0
b.

The Legislative History Supports Protection of Appointed Judges

As discussed below, much in the legislative history of Title VII
suggests that appointed state judges are protected employees under
the ADEA.2 7 1 First, although the House Committee Report does
not mention judges in its discussion of who is to fall within the exceptions to the Title VII definition of "employee," the Report does
state that the Committee intended the exceptions to be construed
262

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
Courts have recognized the usefulness in looking to identical language in related
provisions of different statutes. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Ridgway, 291 F.2d
257 (3d Cir. 1961) (meaning of "transfer" in Internal Revenue Code provision pertaining to trusts determined by reference to same term appearing in different sections of the
263
264

Code).

265 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); EEOC v.
Board of Trustees, 723 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1983); Lopez v. Bulova Watch Co., 582 F.
Supp. 755 (D.R.I. 1984).
266 Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 750-51.
267

Id. at 755.

268

Id.

Id. at 756.
Id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on the legislativq history of
the ADEA in determining that appointed judges are protected. See EEOC v. Vermont,
904 F.2d 794, 798-800 (2d Cir. 1990).
269
270
271
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"narrowly." 27 2 Second, the Senate debates reveal that the drafters
of the exceptions anticipated the exclusion only of elected officials
and their closest advisers. Applicability of the "policymaking" exception to judges was not even contemplated during the Senate's
deliberations.
The Committee Report for the EEOA reveals that Congress
clearly had no intent to exclude appointed judges from ADEA protection.2 78 The Committee states that the purpose of the exceptions
is to
exempt elected officials and members of their personal staffs, and
persons appointed by such elected officials as advisers or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of the departments or agencies
of the State or local governments, such as2cabinet
officers, andpersons
74
of comparable responsibilities at the local level.

Apparent from the Committee's formulation of "policymaking" is
that it intended to limit the exception to members of the executive
branch; the report speaks only of "departments," "agencies," and
"cabinet officers." 275 The Committee very likely intended its list to
be exclusive, as it continues to say that "this exemption shall be con2 76
strued narrowly."
A construction of the term "appointee on the policymaking
level" that would not include appointed judges, thus leaving them
under the ADEA's protection, is consistent with the Senate floor debates over Senator Ervin's proposal to add the exceptions to the
statute.2 77 Absent from the senators' discussion is any mention of
the exceptions applying to judges, either elected or appointed.
What appears instead to have concerned Senator Ervin is the appli272 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2137, 2179-80.
273 Committee reports are one of the most persuasive historical sources for use in
resolving ambiguities in language. See IT&T v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 518
F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) (committee reports entitled to great weight in interpretation);
Housing Auth. v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972) (committee
reports are the most persuasive indicia of congressional intent). The rationale for using
committee reports is the high probability that when Congress enacts legislation, it

adopts the judgment of the committee. This seems especially likely where Congress
passes legislation without changing the language that the committee drafted. 2A C.
SANDS, supra note 193, § 48.06.
274

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, repfintedin 1972 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2179-80 (emphasis added).
275

Id.

276 Id.
277 118 CONG. REc. 4483-94 (1972).
While floor debates in general are not as persuasive an authority as to legislative
intent as other sources, statements made by the drafters of legislation are often afforded
more weight. The rationale for granting such weight to the statements of draftsmen is
that a legislature is more likely to consider their interpretation of a statute when voting
on it. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 193, § 48.13.
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cation that Tide VII might have had to high ranking government
officials were they not excepted from the statute's definition of "employee. ' 27 8 Noting that Tide VII was to extend the definition of
"employer" to include states and municipalities, 279 the Senator expressed his fear that the statute would empower the courts to police
state elections and appointments to state cabinet posts and similar
advisory positions. 28 0 He stated that "it is a monstrous proposal
that Federal judges should have to lay aside their judicial knitting in

order to embark upon a course of action which is essentially super'28
vising who shall be the officers and the employees of a State." '
Senator Williams thereafter questioned Senator Ervin as to the
scope he envisioned for the exceptions to the "employee" defini-

tion. 282 Senator Williams was concerned that a broad interpretation

of the exception might leave vast numbers of public employees un-

protected. 283 It was agreed, however, that the exceptions for appointees and advisers were to be limited to those individuals closest
28 4
to the Executive.
The impression conveyed by the foregoing is that the "appointee" that Congress intended to except from its definition of
"employee" is the individual in close confidence with officials in the
political branches. 285 By excepting such individuals, Congress
118 CONG. REc. 4483 (1972).
See supra text accompanying note 22 for a discussion of the similar ADEA amendment extending the definition of "employer" to include states and municipalities.
278
279

280

118

281

Id.

282

Ik
id at 4492-93.

283
284

CONG.

REC. 4493 (1972).

Id The relevant portion of the exchange between Senators Erwin and Williams
was as follows:
Mr. WILLIAMS ...
[Tihe purpose of the amendment [excluding certain
categories of employees from coverage is] to exempt from coverage those
who are chosen by the Governor or the mayor or the county supervisor,
whatever the elected official is, and who are in a dose personal relationship and an immediate relationship with him. Those who are his first line
of advisers. Is that basically the purpose of the Senator's amendment?
Mr. ERVIN. ...
T]hat is the purpose of the amendment. I feel that
those elected officials who are legal advisers or who are personal assistants or legal advisors, as to how he should exercise his constitutional,
legal rights and responsibilities, should also be exempt....
Mr. WILLIAMS. That is my understanding. As to the degree, certainly
it would cover those who are in a Governor's cabinet .... [I]s that not
correct?
Mr. ERVIN. That is what is intended by this amendment, plus his immediate legal advisers.
Id at 4493.
285 A number of state attorneys general have issued opinions that concur with this
interpretation of the exceptions' legislative history. See Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 86-068
(1986); Op. Att'y Gen. S.C. (1987); Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. 87-8 (1987). The EEOC has also
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could ensure that elected officials and their staff members could be
chosen by the electorate on any ground. The legislators apparently
deemed such reliance crucial to efficient governing.
In contrast with the elected branches, we traditionally view the
judiciary as a branch separate and apart from the political branches.
Congress would have little or no reason to except judicial appointments from ADEA protection. In fact, Congress would be especially
justified in protecting judges against age discrimination, since by extending such protection it could better insulate judges from undue
influence by the legislative or executive branch.
C.

Appointed Judges Should Be Protected

When Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, it had in mind a
broad remedial statute that would change the very way in which employers and employees think about age in the workplace.2 86 As
the Act went through subsequent amendments, its scope grew
broader and its effect farther reaching.2 8 7 In its current form, the
ADEA even regulates the employment practices of states and
2 88
municipalities.
The exceptions to the Act's definition of "employee" that have
given rise to this controversy had as their origin a very narrow concern-that the Act should not protect elected officials and their closest appointed advisers.2 8 9 Perhaps this is the reason why the
committee report in which the exceptions first appear states that
they are to be construed "narrowly." 290
Those courts that have found appointed state judges to be
outside the ADEA's protection have offered a number of justifications for such a holding. 2 91 This Note has attempted to show that
all such justifications are without merit. Congress did not fail
to meet the requirements of the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution, as no clear statement of intent is necessary
when the federal statute directly conflicts with state law.2 9 2 Furthermore, the plain meaning of the ADEA exceptions is not readily apparent, 293 nor is an interpretation that extends the Act's protection
issued an opinion letter concurring with the result that this Note supports. See Application of ADEA to Appointed Judges, Op. EEOC 102 (1987).
286 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.

287

See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.

288

See supra text accompanying note 22.

289

See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.

290
291
292

See supra text accompanying notes 273-76.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-132.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-87.,

293

See supra notes 193-217 and accompanying text.
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to appointed state judges absurd 2 94 or contrary to public policy. 29 5

In fact, the ADEA's legislative history supports a reading of the Act
296
that would protect appointed state judges.
Absent a compelling reason why the ADEA ought not to protect
appointed state judges from state mandatory retirement provisions,
the Act should apply. The broad remedial purpose behind the
ADEA, to eliminate age discrimination, is best served by such a construction. Congress's intent to address the problems faced by older
workers is set out expressly in the text of the Act. 29 7 Courts should

be wary of contradicting that stated purpose through reliance on the
narrow exceptions contained therein.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
as a broad remedy for the injustices that elderly Americans have
faced in retaining and regaining employment. The courts, in attempting to determine whether appointed state judges are included
among the employees protected under the Act, have focused on differing modes of interpreting the exception for "appointee[s] on the
policymaking level." However, the legislative history of Title VII,
an analogous remedial statute, conclusively shows that Congress did
not intend the exception at issue to exclude appointed state judges
from the Act's protection. To the contrary, mandatory retirement
represents the very type of discrimination that Congress, through
the ADEA, sought to eliminate.
Alan L. Bushlow
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295

See supra notes 232-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-31 and accompanying text.
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297

See supra notes 253-85 and accompanying text.

See supra note 2.

